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Well-functioning institutions matter for economic 
development. In order to operate effectively, public 
institutions must also inspire confidence in those they 
serve. The authors use data from the Gallup World 
Poll, a unique and very large global household survey, 
to document a quantitatively large and statistically 
significant negative correlation between corruption 
and confidence in public institutions. This suggests 
an important channel through which corruption can 
inhibit development by eroding confidence in public 
This paper—a product of the Macroeconomics and Growth Team, Development Research Group—is part of a larger effort 
in the department to study the causes and consequences of governance for economic development. Policy Research Working 
Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The author may be contacted at akraay@worldbank.org.   
institutions. This correlation is robust to the inclusion of 
a large set of controls for country and respondent-level 
characteristics, and they show how it can plausibly be 
interpreted as reflecting at least in part a causal effect 
from corruption to confidence. The authors also show 
that individuals with low confidence in institutions 
exhibit low levels of political participation, show 
increased tolerance for violent means to achieve political 
ends, and have a greater desire to “vote with their feet” 
through emigration.  
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1.  Introduction 
Despite considerable debate over definitions, measurement, and methodology, it 
is  widely-accepted  among  academics  and  policymakers  that  well-functioning  public 
institutions play an important role in economic development.  In turn, a key ingredient in 
the effectiveness of public institutions is the confidence that they inspire among those 
whom they serve.  For example, households or firms who do not have confidence in the 
police or the courts are unlikely to avail themselves of their services, and may resort to 
less efficient means of property protection or dispute resolution.  Similarly, if individuals 
lack confidence in the honesty of the electoral process they are unlikely to vote, leading 
to low turnout rates that cast doubt on elected officials‟ popular mandates and their ability 
to carry out their agendas.
2 
In this paper we empirically investigate the role of corruption in undermining 
confidence in public institutions.  We document a quantitatively large and statistically 
significant partial correlation between measures of corruption and confidence in public 
institutions using a unique dataset.  The Gallup World Poll (GWP) is a new and very 
large  cross-country  household  survey,  interviewing  more  than  100,000  households  in 
over  150  countries,  annually  or  biennially  in  most  countries  since  2006.    We  use 
questions  from  the 2008 wave of the GWP, covering over 78,000 respondents  in  90 
countries to study the links between corruption and confidence in public institutions in 
both  developed  and  developing  countries.    Not  surprisingly,  in  countries  where 
respondents  report  a  high  incidence  of  personal  experiences  with  corruption,  and  in 
which perceived corruption is widespread, confidence in public institutions is also low.  
Much more interestingly, we show that this pattern also holds across individuals within 
countries:    individuals  who  experience  corruption  and  who  report  that  corruption  is 
widespread also tend to have lower confidence in public institutions.  We show that this 
correlation is robust to the inclusion of a large set of variables to control for respondent-
level characteristics, including a number of proxies intended to capture the respondent‟s 
                                                 
2 These effects of corruption on confidence have not been lost on policymakers.  A recent quotation from 
Kai Eide, UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, neatly encapsulates this 
view, “..[Corruption] pushes people away from the state and undermines our joint efforts to build peace, 
stability  and  progress  for  Afghanistan's  peoples.”  UNAMA  Press  Release,  United  Nations  Assistance 
Mission, August 20, 2008.   3 
tendency  to  complain  and  report  more  negatively  on  corruption  and  confidence  than 
might otherwise be objectively warranted.  
We  are  not  the  first  to  empirically  explore  the  links  between  corruption  and 
confidence in public institutions.  Relative to the existing literature (which we discuss in 
more detail below), we offer three important contributions.  First and most basic, our 
study covers a much larger set of countries and respondents than any previous work, 
which due to data limitations typically has been focused on small, regionally-focused 
samples of countries.  Second, several features of the GWP allow us to include a very 
rich  set  of  respondent-level  control  variables,  importantly  including  proxies  for 
respondents‟  unobserved  propensity  to  respond  negatively  to  both  questions  about 
corruption and confidence that might artificially bias our results towards finding a strong 
effect of corruption on confidence.   
Third and perhaps most important, we offer a serious analysis of an identification 
problem that has largely been ignored by the existing literature.  Simply documenting that 
survey respondents answer “yes” to a question like “is corruption a problem in  your 
country” and “no” to a question like “are you confident in your national government”, as 
most of the previous literature has done, does little to identify the direction of causation 
between the two.  Perhaps respondents‟ perceptions of the prevalence of corruption drive 
their  low  confidence  in  institutions,  but  just  as  plausibly  the  opposite  could  be  true:  
individuals who lack confidence in public institutions might as a result express the view 
that corruption is widespread.  We are able to provide suggestive evidence on the extent 
of the biases that this endogeneity problem might create by exploiting the difference in 
responses to two questions asked in the GWP.  As we discuss in more detail below, the 
GWP  asks  both  a  generalized  perceptions  of  corruption  question,  as  well  as  a  very 
specific experiential question which asks whether the respondent has been asked for a 
bribe in the past 12 months.  The advantage of the latter question is that it is much more 
plausibly exogenous to respondents‟ confidence in public institutions since it in large part 
reflects the decision of a public official to solicit a bribe from the respondent, rather than 
the  respondent‟s  own  characteristics.    Consistent  with  this  view,  we  find  that  the 
estimated effect of the experiential corruption question is substantially smaller and less   4 
statistically  significant  than  the  corresponding  estimated  effect  using  the  generalized 
perceptions question.  However it remains strongly significant and quantitatively large, 
supporting our claim of an important and plausibly causal effect running from corruption 
to confidence in public institutions. 
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows.  In the next section we review the 
related literature.  Section 3 contains our main empirical results linking corruption to 
confidence in public institutions.  In Section 4 we explore a number of robustness checks 
for this partial correlation, and in Section 5 we discuss in detail the identification problem 
and  potential  solutions.    In  Section  6  we  briefly  document  the  consequences  of  the 
corruption-induced  loss  of  confidence  in  public  institutions,  showing  that  individuals 
with  low  confidence  in  public  institutions  are  less  likely  to  engage  in  the  political 
process, are more likely to condone violence as a means to further political ends, and are 
more likely to “vote with their feet” by emigrating.  Section 7 concludes. 
2.  Related Literature 
It  is  widely  accepted  by  scholars  and  policymakers  that  well-functioning 
institutions are important for development. This conviction has been informed by a wide 
range of historical analysis, case studies, and cross-country empirical analysis.  A few 
examples from this very large literature include North (1990), Knack and Keefer (1995, 
1997), Kaufmann et al. (2000), Acemoglu et al. (2001), and Rodrik et al. (2004). The idea 
that a lack of confidence in public institutions undermines their effectiveness has also 
been widely studied.  A few examples of this literature include Easton (1965, 1975), 
Gibson and Caldeira (1995), Putnam (2000), Uslaner (2002), Gibson et al. (2003), and 
Mishler  and  Rose  (2005).  There  is  also  a  large  literature  on  the  direct  economic 
consequences of corruption for growth and investment, including Mauro (1995), Knack 
and Keefer (1995), Mo (2001), Pellegrini and Gerlagh (2004), and M.on and Sekkat 
(2005), and reviewed by Méon and Sekkat (2004) and Lambsdorff (2007). 
Our contribution is to the small but growing literature on the effects of corruption 
that operate through confidence in public institutions, which we discuss in somewhat 
greater detail.  A number of early papers in this literature exploit essentially country-level 
variation  in  perceptions  of  corruption  and  confidence  in  public  institutions.    These   5 
include Pharr (2000) who looks at aggregate data over time for one country (Japan); 
Della Porta (2000) who provides a verbal discussion of country-level averages of both 
corruption and confidence for just three countries; and Anderson and Tverdova (2003) 
who  combine  country-level  data  on  corruption  perceptions  from  the  Transparency 
International Corruption Perceptions  Index with household survey data on confidence 
from 16 mostly developed countries.  The major drawback of such studies is that they 
cannot control for excluded country characteristics (or year effects in the case of Pharr 
(2000)) that very plausibly might confound the observed relationship between corruption 
and confidence in public institutions.   
A second set of papers improves on these by relying on household-level variation 
in  survey  responses  to  questions  about  corruption  and  confidence  to  estimate  the 
correlation between the two.  These include Rose, Mishler, and Haerpfer (1998), Mishler 
and Rose (2001), Catterberg and Moreno (2005), and Chang and Chu (2006), who all 
document a negative partial correlation between perceptions of corruption and confidence 
in public institutions in small and regionally-focused samples of countries.  These papers 
however do not recognize or attempt to address the identification problem to which we 
have referred in the introduction:  it is unclear from the partial correlations documented 
by these authors whether respondents‟ perceptions of corruption drive their confidence in 
public institutions, or the converse.  Also in this category is a somewhat different, but 
related  paper  by  Hellman  and  Kaufmann  (2004),  who  investigate  how  an  alternative 
measure of corruption perceptions influences firms‟ confidence in, and use of, public 
institutions.  They use data from the World Bank‟s Business Environment and Enterprise 
Performance Survey of 6500 firms in transition economies in 2002 to construct a measure 
of  perceived  „crony  bias‟ as  the  difference  between  firms‟ perceptions  of  their  own 
influence  and  the  influence  of  other  firms  they  view  as  having  strong  political 
connections.    They  show  that  firms  who  perceive  a  great  deal  of  crony  bias  in 
policymaking have less confidence in the judiciary, are less likely to use courts, are more 
likely to pay bribes, and are more likely to cheat on their taxes. 
Four  more  recent  papers  improve  on  the  ones  discussed  so  far  by  relying  on 
respondent-level  data  on  personal  experiences  with  corruption  (and  not  simply   6 
perceptions  of  corruption)  to  study  the  effects  on  confidence  in  public  institutions. 
Seligson (2002) uses survey data for four Latin American countries to test the effects of 
corruption experiences on perceptions of the legitimacy of the political system at the 
individual level. He finds that exposure to corruption erodes belief in the political system 
and  reduces  interpersonal  trust.  Bratton  (2007)  uses  survey  data  from  18  African 
countries  to  document  that  perceptions  of  corruption  are  negatively  correlated  with 
respondents‟  satisfaction  with  public  services,  but  somewhat  surprisingly,  personal 
experience with bribery is positively associated with user satisfaction.  However, these 
two papers also do not recognize or try to address the identification problem that we have 
highlighted in the introduction.
3   
Finally,  Cho  and  Kirwin  (2007)  and  Lavallée,  Razafindrakoto  and  Roubaud 
(2008) use a set of African countries covered by the Afrobarometer survey to investigate 
directly  the  links  between  confidence  in  public  institutions  and  both  corruption 
perceptions  and  corruption  experiences  questions.    Unlike  the  rest  of  the  literature 
surveyed so far, these papers are the only ones to acknowledge the potential for reverse 
causality.  Cho and Kirwin (2007) in particular explicitly stress the possibility of vicious 
cycles:  corruption undermines confidence in public institutions, and this in turn increases 
the acceptability of offering bribes to obtain public services, increasing the prevalence of 
corruption.    Both  papers  propose  using  instrumental  variables  drawn  from  the  same 
survey in order to address this identification problem.  However, as we explain in more 
detail below in our discussion of identification, this strategy depends on the validity of in 
our view  highly implausible exclusion restrictions that the authors make no effort to 
justify. 
In summary, the existing literature on the effect of corruption on confidence in 
public institutions has been based on small samples of countries, and has for the most part 
failed to recognize or address the difficulty of isolating the direction of causation between 
corruption and confidence.  In the remainder of this paper we show how we can use the 
                                                 
3 The identification problem is compounded by the fact that, despite having record-level data for many 
countries, Bratton (2007) does not appear to include country fixed effects in his specifications.  This opens 
the possibility that unobserved country-level effects are confounding the relationship between corruption 
and satisfaction with public services that he studies.   7 
very large sample size and the richness of the GWP core questionnaire to make progress 
on these issues.  
3.  Corruption and Confidence in Institutions in the Gallup World Poll 
The Gallup World Poll (GWP) has been fielded annually or biennially since 2006 
in  over  150  countries  representing  95%  of  the  world‟s adult  population,  and  asks 
questions  on  a wide range of topics.    This  makes  it the largest  (in terms  of country 
coverage) annual multi-country household survey in the world.  The surveys are based on 
a standard methodology and considerable effort goes into ensuring comparability across 
countries.  The surveys are designed to be nationally representative of people who are 15 
years old or older and great efforts are made to interview households in rural areas, as 
well as politically unstable and insecure areas.  The surveys are in-depth face-to-face 
interviews in all countries except the most developed countries such as Western Europe 
or Australia where, for reasons of cost, a shorter version of the survey is fielded  by 
phone.  
The majority of the core questions on the Gallup World Poll are not political in 
nature but concern individuals‟ well-being, asking about their everyday lives, level of 
happiness, life-satisfaction, expectations about their future, daily experiences of stress, 
etc.
4  This tends to build a higher level of trust between the interviewer and respondent 
than a more technical-sounding government-use questionnaire.  Together with an explicit 
statement by the enumerator regarding the confidentiality of responses, this likely helps 
to improve respondent candor on some of the more sensitive questions in the survey.   
We  use  data  from  the  2008  and  early  2009  waves  of  the  GWP.  As  our  key 
measure  of  corruption  we  use  the  following  specific  question  about  the  respondent‟s 
personal experience with corruption: “Sometimes people have to give a bribe or present 
in order to solve their problems. In the last 12 months, were you, personally, faced with 
this kind of situation, or not (regardless of whether you gave a bribe/present)?”  This 
                                                 
4 In this context, we note that a number of recent scholarly papers have used the GWP data for empirical 
research.    Examples  include  Deaton  (2008,  2009),  Helliwell  (2008),  Ng  et  al.  (2008),  Stevenson  and 
Wolfers (2008), Deaton et al. (2009), Gandelman and Hernández-Murillo (2009), Helliwell et al. (2009), 
Krueger and Malečková (2009), and Pelham et al. (2009).  The majority of these focus on GWP questions 
related to subjective assessments of personal well-being.   8 
question, which we will refer to this as the “corruption experiences” question was a new 
addition to the core GWP questionnaire in the 2008 wave of surveys.  However, for 
reasons of timing and questionnaire space, it was asked in only 115 of the 124 countries 
covered in our sample of the GWP in 2008 and early 2009.  This question was asked in 
most high-income OECD, Latin American, Asian and African countries, but coverage of 
Eastern Europe is scarcer.  Nevertheless the breadth of GWP data still allows us to study 
the  effects  of  corruption  experiences  in  a  much  larger  sample  of  countries  and 
respondents than any previous work.  
The GWP also asks a more generic question about the corruption perceptions of 
respondents  that  we  will  use  alongside  the  experience  question  in  this  paper:  “Is 
corruption widespread throughout the government in this country, or not?” We refer to 
this as the “corruption perceptions” question.  It was asked in 112 of the 124 countries in 
our sample. However, as the countries in which the corruption experience and perception 
questions were fielded do not match perfectly, the sample in which both questions were 
asked comprises 103 countries.
5 
There are substantial conceptual and practical differences between the corruption 
experiences and corruption perceptions question.  The former asks about a respondent‟s 
personal  experiences  with  corruption,  while  the  latter  solicits  the  respondent‟s views 
about the prevalence of corruption, regardless of whether the respondent has witnessed or 
experienced any corrupt acts himself.  We note first that one would naturally expect to 
see differences between the responses to the two questions.  The corruption experiences 
question  is  potentially  a  good  gauge  of  “petty”  or  administrative  corruption  that 
individuals might be likely to experience in their everyday lives:  a policeman asking for 
a bribe to avoid a ticket, or a bureaucrat soliciting an irregular payment for a permit.  On 
the other hand, the corruption perceptions question can potentially capture the prevalence 
of  broader  forms  of  corruption,  particularly  at  higher  levels  of  government.    The 
downside of course of this latter question is that it does not draw on the respondent‟s 
personal experience, but rather is informed by the respondent‟s exposure to second-hand 
information about corrupt activities.  Finally, as we argue in more detail in Section 4, a 
                                                 
5 See Table 8 for a complete list of countries used in this study.   9 
crucial advantage of the corruption experiences question is that it is less likely to suffer 
from reverse causality, in the sense that individuals‟ confidence in institutions affects 
their corruption experiences.  This is important for our interpretation of the empirical 
results that follow. 
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the country-level variation in these two measures of 
corruption from the GWP.  Figure 1 plots country average corruption perceptions versus 
corruption  experiences.    All  countries  in  the  sample  fall  above  the  45-degree  line, 
indicating  that  average  corruption  perceptions  are  higher  than  average  corruption 
experiences in every country.  In some cases this gap is extreme.  Countries such as Japan 
or Italy have low rates of personal experience with corruption, but nevertheless strong 
perceptions of widespread corruption in government.  This suggests low rates of petty or 
administrative corruption but a greater incidence of high-level or political corruption.  In 
Figure 2 we plot the two corruption questions from the GWP against a broad perceptions-
based  measure  of  corruption,  the  Worldwide  Governance  Indicators  „Control  of 
Corruption‟ variable (Kaufmann et al., 2008).  Both corruption questions display a fairly 
strong  negative  correlation  with  the  Control  of  Corruption  measure.    However,  this 
correlation is far from perfect, in part due  to the fact that the Control of Corruption 
measure aggregates information from a large number of different data sources. 
Our main objective in this paper is to document the links between corruption and 
confidence in public institutions.  We measure the latter using another question in the 
GWP, which asks respondents about their confidence in a variety of institutions at the 
national  level.    Specifically,  the  GWP  asks  “Do  you  have  confidence  in  each  of  the 
following?:  (a) the military, (b) judicial system and courts, (c) national government, (d) 
health  care  or  medical  systems,  (e)  financial  institutions  or  banks,  (f)  religious 
organizations, (g) quality and integrity of the media, and (h) honesty of elections.   In our 
core specifications we sum together the responses to (a), (b), (c) and (h) to obtain an 
index of confidence in public institutions that ranges from 0 (respondents who report no 
confidence in any of the four institutions) to 4 (respondents who report confidence in all 
four institutions).    10 
Figure 3 documents how this measure of confidence in institutions from the GWP 
compares with the most closely related variables on confidence in institutions taken from 
the World Values Survey.
6 While the two measures are highly correlated in the common 
sample of countries for which both measures are available (a correlation of 0.81), it is 
worth noting the significantly smaller country coverage of the WVS. The circles in the 
graph represent countries that are present in our sample of the GWP but not in the most 
recent  wave of the WVS.  Using the GWP index therefore significantly increases  the 
available sample to study effects of corruption on confidence in institutions.  
Finally, Figure 4 documents the relationship between the corruption questions and 
the confidence in institutions index at the country level.  The top panel plots corruption 
perceptions  against  confidence  in  institutions  and  the  bottom  panel  plots  corruption 
experiences  against  confidence.  Both  graphs  display  a  negative  relationship  between 
corruption  and  confidence  although  this  is  much  more  pronounced  for  corruption 
perceptions. Here, all countries with very low average corruption perceptions score high 
on  confidence  in  institutions.  Scandinavian  countries  are  the  ones  with  the  lowest 
perceived corruption and the highest confidence in institutions. Turning to corruption 
experiences, we see that in general countries with a higher share of people that have 
experienced  corruption  report  lower  confidence  in  institutions.  However,  there  are  a 
number of countries that have low levels of experienced corruption but still report low 
confidence. In this group we find particularly Latin American and Caribbean countries 
such as Panama, Argentina, Peru, and Trinidad and Tobago. 
                                                 
6  The  WVS  asks  about  respondents‟  confidence  in  a  variety  of  institutions.  We  aimed  to  match  this 
confidence index as closely as possible to our GWP index and therefore aggregated the answers to the 
following four questions into an index ranging from 0 to 4: “I am going to name a number of organizations. 
For each one, could you tell me how much confidence you have in them […]: a) the armed forces, b) the 
courts, c) the government (in your nation‟s capital), d) parliament.”    11 
3.  Main Results:  Respondent-Level Evidence on Corruption and Confidence in 
Institutions 
  While  the  cross-country  relationship  between  corruption  and  confidence  in 
institutions described above is suggestive of a link between the two, it is also not fully 
convincing.  A major concern here is that there may be many country-specific factors 
driving both  variables.  For example, some countries  may simply have dysfunctional 
states.  On the one hand this will lead to high levels of corruption, and on the other hand 
public  institutions  naturally  do  not  inspire  confidence  in  such  an  environment.    Any 
correlation  between  our  two  variables  would  simply  reflect  the  omitted  variable  of 
government quality that is driving both corruption and confidence in public institutions.   
  To address this first concern, we primarily focus on the respondent-level variation 
within  countries  to  study  the  relationship  between  corruption  and  confidence  in 
institutions.  Doing so allows us to control for any unobserved or observed country-level 
characteristics that might be driving the cross-country correlation.  Table 1 documents the 
distinction  between  the  within-  and  between-country  results.  Columns  1  and  3  show 
coefficients  of  cross-country  regressions  of  confidence  in  institutions  on  the  two 
corruption measures, aggregating both variables to the country level.  In contrast columns 
2 and 4 report on the corresponding regressions including country fixed effects.
7 In all 
cases we find a negative correlation between corruption and confidence in institutions 
that  is  highly  statistically  significant.    In  the  cross-country  variation,  the  estimated 
coefficients imply that a one-standard-deviation increase (across countries) in either of 
the two corruption measures reduces confidence in institutions by between 0.3 and 0.4 
points  on  a  0-4  scale.
8  Within  countries,  the  relationship  between  corruption  and 
confidence  is  also  very  strong.  Here  a  one  standard  deviation  increases  of  either 
corruption variable within a country leads to a reduction of confidence in institutions of 
                                                 
7 It would technically be more appropriate to estimate an ordered probit model because of the discrete and 
ordered nature of our dependent variable. Doing this does not change the sign or level of significance of the 
coefficients. However, because of the difficulties involved with interpreting ordered probit coefficients as 
marginal effects, we chose to present linear regression results throughout the paper. 
8 Note that the cross-country standard deviations of corruption experiences and perceptions are 0.083 and 
0.184, respectively.   12 
between 0.1 and 0.3 points.
9  Anticipating our later discussion of endogeneity problems, 
we note that the estimated effect of the corruption perceptions question is nearly three 
times as large as the effect of the corruption experiences question.  This is consistent with 
our  view  that  the  former  is  much  more  likely  to  be  endogenous  to  respondents‟ 
confidence in public institutions, and that the latter much more plausibly identifies a 
causal effect running from corruption to confidence.  While the estimated coefficients are 
statistically significant and quantitatively large, we note that the explanatory power of 
corruption  for  the  confidence  question  is  limited.    In  particular,  in  the  fixed-effects 
regressions, the bulk of the R-squared is due to the country dummies.  In contrast, the 
within R-squared net of the country fixed effects is 0.01 for the corruption experiences 
question, and 0.06 for the corruption perceptions question. 
  Although within-country regressions in Table 1 control for country-level omitted 
variables, a possible objection is that there may also be a variety of individual-specific 
characteristics that influence respondents' confidence in institutions and the likelihood 
that they view corruption as prevalent, or that they report having been solicited for a 
bribe.    For  example,  richer,  older,  and  more  educated  people  might  have  more 
interactions with the state and so be more likely to find themselves exposed to corruption, 
and might also be more likely to have a cynical world view that precludes expressing 
confidence in public institutions. 
  To control for this we introduce a set of core control variables that we have found 
to  be  correlated  with  the  corruption  questions,  and  that  also  tend  to  be  significant 
predictors of confidence in institutions.  These include respondent age, gender, marital 
status, education, and income.  We also introduce as basic control variables whether the 
household  in  which  the  respondent  lives  has  access  to  the  internet  and  a  television. 
Access to such media may have ambiguous effects on individual‟s opinions about and 
experiences with corruption and institutions. On the one hand,  officials might have a 
harder time extracting bribes from more informed citizens that have had the chance to 
obtain  information  about  laws  and  regulations  concerning  their  dealings  with 
government.  On  the  other  hand,  coverage  of  corruption  cases  in  the  media  might 
                                                 
9 Within-country standard deviation of corruption experiences is 0.360 and of corruption perceptions 0.368.   13 
influence corruption perceptions of individuals and may therefore have a direct effect on 
the answers to the perceptions question used in the GWP.  
  Table 2 presents the results. We note first that missing data presents a problem 
when introducing our set of core control variables. In particular, data availability for 
education and income is an issue and decreases our sample to about 57,000 individuals in 
94 countries. To aid in comparison with the previous results, we first repeat the results 
with no controls from Table 1 in the smaller sample for which the control variables are 
available, and then report results with controls.  Reducing the size of the sample in this 
way  makes  little  difference  for  the  effect  of  corruption  on  confidence  in  public 
institutions:  the results without control variables in columns (1) and (3) of Table 2 are 
essentially identical to those in columns (2) and (4) of Table 1. Second, we note that 
while the additional control variables featured in Table 2 do show some correlation with 
both the corruption and confidence variables, we find that the estimated coefficients on 
the  corruption  variables  change  very  little,  declining  just  slightly  in  absolute  value.  
Finally, we note that the control variables all enter with expected signs and are generally 
significant. Older individuals seem to have a lower degree of confidence in institutions 
although  this  relationship  is  not  linear.  Also,  married  respondents  express  higher 
confidence than single ones. Higher income and education as well as access to internet 
and TV appear to  reduce confidence although  these  latter  effects  are  not  statistically 
significant in all cases. 
  While  the  results  in  Table  2  are  suggestive  of  a  strong  relationship  between 
confidence in institutions on the one hand, and corruption perceptions and experiences on 
the other, one might nevertheless reasonably worry that this correlation is driven by other 
unobserved respondent-specific characteristics. A leading possibility is that, conditional 
on  the  basic  control  variables  described  above,  some  individuals  may  simply  have  a 
negative outlook or worldview which makes them more likely to think that corruption is 
widespread, and at the same time drives their lack of confidence in public institutions.  
Kaufmann and Wei (2000) coin this as a "kvetch" effect, after the Yiddish word for 
habitual complaining.  To the extent that this drives the observed correlation between   14 
corruption and confidence in public institutions, we cannot interpret it as a causal link 
from the former to the latter.
10 
At first glance, one might think that this potential problem of “kvetch” is less 
severe  for  the  corruption  experiences  question  than  for  the  corruption  perceptions 
question. While ostensibly an objective question about the respondent's experience, there 
are nevertheless ways in which kvetch might creep into responses to this question as well.  
First, respondents prone to kvetch might simply falsely claim that they had been solicited 
for a bribe. They might also be more likely to interpret the fine line between tips and 
bribes  in  the  direction  of  the  latter.  Therefore,  respondents  who  in  general  tend  to 
complain a lot might also be more likely to report interactions with public officials as 
involving  a  request  for  a  bribe.  Second,  the  question  about  experiences  with  bribery 
follows a battery of other questions about corruption, one of which is the corruption 
perceptions questions described above. It is possible that respondents prone to kvetch 
want  to  enforce  their  point  of  stating  that  government  corruption  is  a  problem  by 
answering that they personally have found themselves in a bribe situation.  
  Our strategy for dealing with this problem is to introduce control variables that we 
think may be good proxies for the propensity to kvetch. We consider three sets of such 
proxies.
11  The first set relies on questions in the survey that focus on individuals' self-
reported well-being. For example, the GWP asks respondents whether they are satisfied 
with their living standards, and which rung on the ladder of life that they find themselves. 
The GWP also asks respondents whether they have felt a variety of emotions such as 
worry, stress, or happiness in the previous day. These variables are plausibly correlated 
with  individual  respondents'  predisposition  to  complain.  Second,  the  GWP  asks 
respondents their opinions about a number of country-level variables including whether 
the economy is doing well or poorly, whether the economic outlook is favorable, and 
whether corruption is getting better or worse. Since our regressions include country fixed 
effects that soak up all national-level variation, variation in individuals' responses to these 
                                                 
10 Newton and Norris (2000) examined the question if trust and confidence is a feature of basic personality 
types but found little evidence to support this thesis. 
11 See table 7 for a detailed description of the kvetch proxies and the specific GWP questions used in their 
construction.   15 
questions  can  be  interpreted  as  capturing  their  idiosyncratic  perceptions  of  the  same 
national-level reality, and as such will also plausibly be correlated with kvetch.  
  As a final control for kvetch, we note that the battery of questions from which our 
"confidence  in  institutions"  variables  are  drawn  includes  a  further  question  about 
confidence in religious organizations. It seems plausible to us that corruption perceptions 
or  experiences  are  likely  to  have  little  direct  impact  on  confidence  in  religious 
organizations.  However there might be an indirect effect through kvetch:  individuals 
more  likely  to  complain  in  general  might  also  report  less  confidence  in  religious 
organizations purely because of their propensity to kvetch.  This suggests using a kind of 
differencing  strategy  to  control  for  kvetch.    In  particular,  one  might  ask  whether 
corruption reduces the difference in confidence in public institutions and confidence in 
religious  organizations.    Alternatively  and  more  flexibly,  we  can  simply  introduce 
confidence in religious organizations directly into our main specification as a control for 
kvetch. 
  Table 3 documents the results controlling for these proxies for kvetch.  Since not 
all of the kvetch variables are available for all observations, our sample shrinks further to 
49,019  respondents  in  90 countries.  As in  Table 2, we  first  document  that our main 
results with basic respondent-level controls do not change as we move to this smaller 
sample (compare columns (1) and (3) in Tables 2 and 3). More interesting is how our 
results  on  the  effects  of  corruption  perceptions  and  experiences  on  confidence  in 
institutions  change when we control  for ketch.  We find that the estimated impact  of 
corruption  on  confidence  falls  by  about  34  percent  (for  the  corruption  experiences 
question) and by 40 percent (for the corruption perceptions question). This is a good 
indication that kvetch effects are present in the data and are at least partially addressed by 
the controls that we introduce.  Interestingly, while both the corruption perceptions and 
corruption experiences questions might be subject to kvetch, we think it is plausible that 
kvetch effects are stronger for the former.  The results in Table 3 are consistent with this: 
the coefficient on the corruption perceptions falls relatively more after the introduction of 
the kvetch controls. However, even after introducing these very rigorous controls for   16 
kvetch,  the  negative  relationship  between  corruption  and  confidence  remains  highly 
significant and the magnitude of both corruption coefficients stays impressive. 
4.  Robustness of the Main Results 
  Thus far we have seen that there is a large and statistically significant partial 
correlation between measures of corruption and confidence in public institutions, and that 
this result is robust to the addition of (a) country fixed effects, (b) a set of respondent-
level controls, and (c) a set of proxies for „kvetch‟.  In this section we subject these main 
results to a variety of further robustness checks.  We first disaggregate the confidence in 
institutions  measure  into  its  four  components  and  investigate  how  the  effects  of 
corruption vary across these components.  We then also estimate our main specification 
country-by-country,  and  document  how  the  estimated  coefficients  on  the  corruption 
questions vary by country, by level of corruption, and by level of development.  Finally, 
we discuss the extent to which this robust partial correlation between corruption and 
confidence that we have documented can be interpreted as a causal effect from the former 
to the latter. 
In Table 4 we disaggregate the confidence in institutions measure into its four 
components:  confidence  in  the  military,  judiciary,  national  government,  and  in  the 
honesty of elections. In the first four columns we report results for our core specification, 
using  each  of  these  components  of  the  overall  confidence  measure  separately  as  the 
dependent variable.
12  We do this for both the corruption experiences (top panel) and 
corruption  perceptions  measure  (bottom panel).   In all cases,  we include, but  do not 
report estimated coefficients for, the full set of control variables used in Table 3.  For the 
corruption experiences question, we find only modest differences across components in 
terms  of  the  magnitude  of  the  estimated  partial  correlation  between  corruption  and 
confidence.  This effect is largest for confidence in the judiciary at 0.06, and smallest for 
confidence in the honesty of elections, at 0.04.  There is somewhat more variation across 
                                                 
12 Since the dependent variable for the individual confidence in institutions regressions is a binary variable, 
a probit specification would be more appropriate than the linear probability model that we report (for 
consistency with previous results).  We have also estimated the specifications in Table 4 using a probit 
model  and  find  a  similar  pattern  of  relative  magnitudes  of  the  effect  of  corruption  on  the  different 
confidence in institutions variables.     17 
the various confidence measures for the corruption perceptions question.  The estimated 
effect of corruption is much lower for confidence in the military, at 0.06, than it is for the 
other three measures, which range from 0.13 to 0.17.   
  Thus far we have assumed that the slope of the relationship between corruption 
and confidence in public institutions is the same in all countries, at all income levels, and 
at  all  levels  of  corruption.  We  now  relax  this  assumption  and  re-estimate  our  main 
specification from Table 3, country-by-country, so that we can investigate how this slope 
varies across countries.  We note first that the means of the country-by-country estimates 
in Table 5 are slightly smaller than the pooled estimates in Table 3 (at -0.13 and -0.47 for 
the  corruption  experiences  and  perceptions  questions,  respectively).    The  sign  of  the 
estimated coefficient is also fairly consistently negative across countries, with 67 percent 
(91  percent)  of  country  estimates  being  negative  for  the  corruption  experiences 
(perceptions) question.  However, and not surprisingly, in many countries the estimated 
effects are not statistically significant, given the much smaller sample of observations on 
which to base inference in each country.  In fact, the mean number of observations per 
country for the regressions in Table 5 is just 594, as opposed to 49,019 in the pooled 
regressions of Table 3.   
We next examine how these estimated coefficients vary across regions (using the 
standard  World  Bank  regional  classification).  While  it  is  evident  that  corruption 
experiences as well as perceptions affect confidence negatively in all regions on average, 
the magnitude and strength of the relationship varies widely across regions, from -0.06 to 
-0.32  in  the  case  of  corruption  experiences,  and  from  -0.10  to  -1.00  in  the  case  of 
corruption perceptions.  In the case of corruption experiences, the largest mean estimated 
effect is for the South Asia region.  The relationship between corruption and confidence 
in institutions is also the strongest in this region with 60 percent of countries reporting a 
statistically significant negative relationship.  At the same time however, while South 
Asia showed the largest coefficient of corruption experiences, its perceptions coefficient 
is the smallest among the regions in our sample.  
  In the remaining panels of Table 5 we document how the estimated correlation 
between corruption and confidence varies with the average level of corruption, and the   18 
level of development, of the country.  To do this, we divide countries into three equal 
groups according to their country-level average score on the corruption question, and also 
their  level  of  GDP  per  capita.    We  then  report  the  mean  (across  countries)  of  the 
estimated slope coefficient on corruption from the country-by-country regressions, for 
each  group.  In the case of corruption  experiences,  there is a pronounced non-linear 
relationship  in  countries‟  overall  level  of  corruption.    In  countries  where  reported 
corruption experiences are on average either very low or very high, the estimated effect 
of  corruption  experiences  on  confidence  in  institutions  is  small  (at  0.07  and  0.09 
respectively).  In contrast, for intermediate-corruption countries, the adverse effect of 
corruption on confidence is much larger.   
This suggests that in countries where corruption is rare, a respondent's isolated 
experience with having been solicited for a bribe will not be enough to substantially 
undermine his or her faith in overall public institutions. And similarly, in countries where 
corruption is widespread, personal experiences with or perceptions of corruption might 
also not change confidence in public institutions because this confidence is very low to 
begin with.  In contrast, for countries with a moderate prevalence of corruption, personal 
experiences  with  corruption  have  a  stronger  adverse  impact  on  confidence  in  public 
institutions.  Interestingly,  however,  this  pattern  is  not  present  in  the  corruption 
perceptions question, nor is it present when countries are divided into groups according to 
income levels. 
5.  Concerns About Endogeneity 
We now discuss the extent to which the partial correlation between corruption and 
confidence in public institutions can be interpreted as a causal effect from the former to 
the latter.  As noted in the introduction, there is an important identification problem:  
corruption might lead to a loss of confidence in public institutions as we emphasize here, 
but at the same time, respondents who report low confidence in public institutions might 
as a result hold the belief that corruption is widespread as well.  This point is also noticed 
by Cho and Kirwin (2007) who argue that individuals who do not trust public institutions 
might be more likely to resort to bribery to advance their interests, or to believe that 
corruption is widespread.   This can lead to vicious circles where corruption and a lack of   19 
confidence in public institutions feed off each other.  This potential for bi-directional 
causation complicates the interpretation of the partial correlation between corruption and 
confidence in institutions that we have documented.  This is the classic identification 
problem:    the  observed  correlation  between  corruption  and  confidence  might  reflect 
causal effects from corruption to confidence that we emphasize.  But it could also reflect 
causation in the opposite direction. 
We note first that a unique strength of the corruption experiences question is that 
it is much less likely to be prone to reverse causation than the corruption perceptions 
question.  To see why, recall that the experience question asks respondents whether they 
have been solicited for a bribe during the past 12 months.  To the extent that the decision 
to  solicit  a  bribe  originates  with  the  public  official  with  whom  the  respondent  is 
interacting, there should be no problems of reverse causation.  It seems unlikely that a 
public official would even know the respondent‟s confidence in public institutions, let 
alone base his decision to solicit a bribe on it.  This stands in contrast with the corruption 
perceptions question, where there is a more plausible channel of causation in the opposite 
direction:  individuals who have low confidence in public institutions may precisely for 
this  reason  also  believe  that  corruption  is  widespread  in  government.    This  potential 
endogeneity bias may in part account for the fact that in most of our specifications thus 
far, the estimated slope of the relationship between corruption perceptions and confidence 
is  larger  in  absolute  value,  and  typically  is  also  much  more  significant,  than  in  the 
regressions using the corruption experiences question.  Thus we argue that our results 
using the corruption experiences question provide a fairly plausible estimate of the causal 
effect of corruption on confidence in public institutions. 
At the same time, we acknowledge that there may still be such endogeneity bias, 
although to a lesser extent, even in the corruption experiences question.  This would 
occur if respondents expressing a low confidence in public institutions are more likely to 
interpret an ambiguous interaction with a public official as a request for a bribe than other 
respondents with higher confidence in public institutions.  Such potential endogeneity 
bias is extremely difficult to correct using purely cross-sectional observational data such 
as what we have in the GWP.  The usual strategy with observational data of identifying   20 
instruments  (variables  that  plausibly  affect  only  corruption,  but  not  confidence  in 
institutions, and vice versa) is very difficult to implement since it is hard to make a 
compelling case for the requisite exclusion restrictions.   
In particular, we find it hard to make a convincing case that there are variables in 
the GWP that predict corruption at the individual level but do not have predictive power 
for confidence in institutions that we could then use as instruments for corruption.  To 
illustrate  why  we  think  this  approach  is  not  promising,  consider  the  identifying 
assumptions  implicit  in  the  few  papers  that  have  considered  this  reverse  causation 
problem.  Cho and Kirwin (2007) make the identifying assumption that variables such as 
respondents‟ overall trust in others, and their perceptions of the political influence of 
ethnic  groups,  matter  only  for  corruption  and  has  no  direct  effect  on  confidence  in 
institutions (see their Table 1).  Lavallee, Razafindrakoto, and Robaud (2008) claim with 
little justification that a dummy variable indicating that the respondent is head of the 
household, and a variable capturing the respondent‟s views on the acceptability of paying 
a bribe, matter only for corruption and have no direct effect on confidence.  We do not 
find such exclusion restrictions to be convincing.  One might easily imagine that any of 
these variables are directly correlated with confidence in public institutions:  for example 
respondents‟ might believe that paying a bribe is acceptable precisely because they have 
no  confidence  in  public  institutions.  It  is  also  striking  that  in  both  papers,  the 
instrumented estimates of the effects of corruption on confidence are vastly larger in 
absolute  value  than  the  uninstrumented  estimates,  while  the  feedback  problem  these 
authors seek to correct would suggest that the true effects of corruption on confidence 
should be much smaller in absolute value than the corresponding OLS estimates (see 
columns  (1)  and  (2)  of  Table  1  in  Cho  and  Kirwin  (2007)  and  Table  4  in  Lavalee, 
Razafindrakoto and Robaud (2008)).  These counterintuitive results likely signal nothing 
more  than  a  failure  of  the  exclusion  restrictions  required  to  justify  the  instrumental 
variables estimator.
13 14  In contrast, we have consistently found that the magnitude of the 
                                                 
13 Lavalee, Razafindrakoto and Robaud (2008) claim support for their identification strategy in the fact that 
tests of overidentifying restrictions fail to reject the null of instrument validity.  Here they fall into the 
(unfortunately common) pitfall of failing to realize that such tests are valid only if at least one instrument is 
indeed valid.  We think it is very difficult to make such a case in this context.   21 
effect of the more exogenous corruption experiences question on confidence is always 
substantially smaller than the effect of the corruption perceptions question, consistent 
with the view that the former is less tainted by reverse causation. 
Absent compelling instruments, we use an argument based on Leamer (1981) to 
provide  a  rough  bound  on  the  extent  to  which  our  estimates  might  reflect  reverse 
causation.  To make this concrete let y denote the portion of confidence that is orthogonal 
to all of the control variables, including the country fixed effects, in columns 2 and 4 of 
Table 3, and let x denote the same orthogonal component of corruption.  The possibility 
of causal effects in both directions between corruption and confidence can be captured by 
the assumption that y and x are generated by the following system of two equations: 
(1)         
We  are  primarily  interested  in  the  slope  coefficient    which  captures  the  effect  of 
corruption  on  confidence.    However,  we  cannot  identify  this  effect  absent  some 
instrument that shifts corruption without at the same time affecting confidence, i.e. we 
need to find a variable that is included in the second equation but excluded from the first. 
Absent such an instrument, the problem is simply that there are four unknown 
parameters in this system ( ,  , and the two variances of the error terms), while there are 
just three moments in the data (V(x), V(y), and COV(x,y)).
15  However, we can still make 
progress by exploring how our estimate of   would change given differing assumptions 
on the strength of the reverse causation captured by  .  To do this, express the three 
observable data moments in terms of the four unknown parameters, and then solve for   
conditional on a value of  .  Then by varying   we can explore the robustness of our 
                                                                                                                                                 
14 An alternative approach sometimes used with survey data is to use the average of the corruption question 
across all observations within a pre-specified group, for example all respondents in the same city, as an 
instrument for corruption.  This is plausible as an identification strategy only to the extent that we think that 
the unexplained portion of confidence is uncorrelated across respondents within a group.  This assumption 
is difficult to justify in practice.  
15 In fact things might be even more complicated, as we have assumed for simplicity that the covariance 
between the two structural errors is zero as well.  We justify this simplifying assumption by observing that 
in Table 3 we have already controlled for a large set of variables that might simultaneously be driving 
corruption and confidence.  Thus it is more plausible that the errors in the orthogonalized system here are 
independent.   22 
conclusions  about    to  alternative  assumptions  regarding  the  strength  of  the  reverse 
causation.  Some simple algebra delivers this very natural estimator for   as a function of 
: 
(2)       
Note that when   we retrieve the OLS estimator, i.e.  , since in 
this case there is no feedback from confidence to corruption, and so OLS is valid.  On the 
other  hand,  note  that    when    which  is  simply  the  OLS 
estimate of the feedback effect in the second equation.  This is because if there is in fact 
no causal effect running from corruption to confidence, then the second equation can be 
estimated by OLS.
16  Moreover, the range from =0 to   seems to us 
to  be  a  reasonable  prior  bound  for  the  magnitude  of  reverse  causation.    It  seems 
reasonable to assume that <0, i.e. less confidence implies more corruption.  However, 
the  magnitude  of  this  effect  is  likely  to  be  less  (in  absolute  value)  than 
.    If  it  were  not,  then  the  data  would  imply  that  >0,  i.e.  that 
corruption raises confidence in public institutions, which seems implausible. 
We  plot  this  estimate  of    (on  the  vertical  axis)  as  a  function  of    (on  the 
horizontal axis) in Figure 5, using this prior plausible range of values for the magnitude 
of reverse causation.  The top panel refers to the corruption experiences question, and the 
bottom to the corruption perceptions question.  In both panels, when =0 we retrieve the 
OLS estimates of  on the horizontal axis corresponding to those in Columns (2) and (4) 
of Table 3.  As we allow for the possibility of more and more reverse causation, i.e. as  
becomes more and more negative capturing a stronger effect of confidence on corruption, 
our estimate of the main effect of interest, , becomes closer and closer to zero.  We also 
report 95 percent confidence intervals for , and these suggest that our estimate of  
would be insignificantly different from zero only if  were very large (in absolute value).  
In particular, we note that the 95 percent confidence interval for  includes zero only 
                                                 
16 While rarely used, it is interesting to note that the basic argument here is nearly 80 years old!  Leamer 
(1981) credits Leontief (1929) with first performing this basic calculation.   23 
when <-0.15 in the case of the corruption experiences question, and when <-0.04 for 
the corruption perceptions question.  This represents less than one-quarter of the plausible 
range for  indicated on the horizontal axis in each figure.   
We conclude from this that it is a priori very plausible that there are in general 
causal effects running in both directions between corruption and confidence in public 
institutions.  In this paper we are concerned primarily with the channel from corruption to 
confidence.    While  we  are  unable  to  formally  isolate  this  channel  using  credible 
instruments  given  data  limitations,  we  nevertheless  argue  that  there  are  at  least  two 
reasons why the results we show are at least partially interpretable as a causal effect from 
corruption to confidence.  The first is that, as we have discussed, it is much more difficult 
to  see  the  channel  for  potential  reverse  causation  in  the  results  using  the  corruption 
experiences question.  The second is that, even if reverse causation were present, it would 
need  to  be  extremely  strong  in  order  to  undermine  our  conclusion  of  a  statistically 
significant effect of corruption on confidence. 
6.  Why  Does  the  Adverse  Effect  of  Corruption  on  Confidence  in  Institutions 
Matter? 
Thus far we have documented a strong negative relationship between corruption 
and confidence in public institutions. We conclude by investigating the consequences of 
this loss of confidence, finding that reduced confidence in public institutions leads to a 
reduction  in  political  participation,  raises  support  for  violent  means  of  political 
expression, and increases the desire of respondents to 'vote with their feet' and emigrate.   
We draw on a number of questions from the GWP to measure these consequences 
of corruption-induced losses in confidence.  To measure political participation, we use 
the GWP question which asks “In the past month, have you voiced your opinion to a 
public official?"  As a measure of support for violent forms of protest, we use a question 
from the GWP which asks: “Do you think groups that are oppressed and are suffering 
from injustice can improve their situation by peaceful means alone?”  And finally, the 
desire  to  emigrate  is  captured  by  response  to  the  question  "Ideally,  if  you  had  the   24 
opportunity, would you like to move permanently to another country, or would you prefer 
to continue living in this country?"   
In  Table 6  we document  the relationship  between corruption, confidence, and 
these three outcomes.  In the first column, we report the simple bivariate relationship 
between the confidence variable and the three outcome variables of interest, and in the 
second column we introduce the full set of control variables from Table 3.  We find 
strong evidence that a lack of confidence in public institutions raises sympathy for violent 
protest,  raises  the  desire  to  migrate,  and  reduces  political  participation.    We  next 
investigate  the  extent  to  which  this  reflects  the  effect  of  corruption  perceptions  and 
corruption experiences. In columns three and four we estimate regressions of the three 
variables on the two corruption variables alone (but still controlling for the full set of 
control  variables from  Table 3).  Here we find evidence those individuals  who have 
experienced  corruption  or  who  perceive  corruption  to  be  high  in  their  country  show 
support  for  violent  protest  and  express  increased  desire  to  permanently  leave  their 
country.  In  addition,  we  find  that  having  had  a  corruption  experience  lowers  the 
likelihood of individuals voicing their opinion to public officials. 
Finally,  we  introduce  both  corruption  measures  together  with  confidence  in 
institutions as explanatory variables.  Doing so sheds light on whether the effects of 
corruption on these outcomes operate only through confidence in institutions (in which 
case the corruption variables would not enter significantly), or whether there are direct 
effects of corruption (in which case they would enter significantly even after controlling 
for confidence in public institutions).  In the case of corruption experiences, there seems 
to be fairly clear evidence of both direct and indirect effects, as both the corruption and 
confidence variables enter significantly.  In the case of corruption experiences however 
the effects seem to run more through confidence in institutions.  These findings provide 
some support to the findings of Putnam (2000) and Uslaner (2002) that institutional trust 
contributes to citizen‟s involvement in the political process.  
7.  Conclusions 
In this paper we have used data from the Gallup World Poll, a unique and very 
large  global  household  survey,  to  document  a  quantitatively  large  and  statistically   25 
significant  negative  effect  of  corruption  on  confidence  in  public  institutions.    This 
highlights an important, but relatively under-examined, channel through which corruption 
can  inhibit  development.    Our  findings  are  robust  to  the  inclusion  of  a  large  set  of 
controls for country and respondent-level characteristics.  In addition to considering a 
much larger sample of countries and a more thorough set of control variables, our main 
contribution relative to the existing literature is our treatment of potential endogeneity 
biases.  We have argued that a key advantage of specific experiential questions about 
corruption  is  that  they  are  much  more  plausibly  exogenous  to  respondents‟ reported 
confidence  in  public  institutions.    As  a  result,  the  partial  correlation  between  such 
questions and confidence can much more plausibly be interpreted as a causal effect from 
the former to the latter. 
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Figure 2: Correlation of GWP Corruption Experiences and Perceptions Questions 


















































































































-1 0 1 2 3
WGI
Fitted Values













































































































-1 0 1 2 3
WGI
Fitted Values
GWP corruption perceptions - WGI
 
   32 
Figure 3: Comparing Confidence in Institutions: Country Average Values of GWP 
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Figure 5:  Robustness of Main Results to Reverse Causation 
 














































Beta(Gamma) Beta(Gamma)-2*se(betaOLS) Beta(Gamma)+2*se(OLS)  35 
Table 1: Bivariate Cross Country and Fixed Effects Regressions on the Relationship 
between Confidence in Institutions and Corruption 









cross-country fixed effects cross-country fixed effects
Corruption experiences -5.164*** -0.287***
(-3.16) (-8.94)
Corruption perceptions -1.785** -0.854***
(-2.35) (-21.32)
_cons 2.482*** 1.287*** 2.993*** 1.919***
(9.53) (176.37) (5.60) (58.70)
N 103 78063 103 78063
No. of countries 103 103 103 103
R-sq 0.102 0.230 0.059 0.271
t-statistics in parentheses: * p<0.10,  ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table 2: Fixed Effects Regressions Including Control Variables 









Corruption experiences -0.298*** -0.282***
(-7.73) (-7.41)










Secondary education -0.121*** -0.115***
(-3.94) (-4.02)








_cons 1.273*** 1.619*** 1.926*** 2.324***
(192.07) (11.91) (56.67) (17.86)
N 57095 57095 57095 57095
No. of countries 94 94 94 94
R-sq 0.226 0.230 0.271 0.275
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Table 3: Fixed Effects Regressions Controlling for Kvetch 









Corruption experiences -0.280*** -0.185***
(-6.67) (-5.62)
Corruption perceptions -0.873*** -0.518***
(-20.05) (-16.37)
Male 0.0123 -0.00647 -0.00512 -0.0144
(0.52) (-0.34) (-0.23) (-0.78)
Age -0.0157*** -0.00135 -0.0141*** -0.00118
(-5.90) (-0.54) (-5.21) (-0.47)
Age2 0.000198*** 0.0000456* 0.000180*** 0.0000425
(6.76) (1.66) (6.02) (1.53)
Married 0.0890*** 0.0399** 0.0739*** 0.0342*
(4.05) (2.13) (3.37) (1.80)
Secondary education -0.131*** -0.118*** -0.124*** -0.116***
(-3.94) (-4.79) (-4.04) (-4.81)
Tertiary education -0.0822 -0.0791* -0.102** -0.0916**
(-1.49) (-1.74) (-2.18) (-2.21)
Income -0.000267 -0.0470*** -0.00943 -0.0488***
(-0.02) (-3.68) (-0.68) (-3.76)
Internet access -0.0612* -0.0784*** -0.0817** -0.0872***
(-1.71) (-3.17) (-2.55) (-3.68)
TV -0.0327 -0.101*** -0.0234 -0.0943**
(-0.67) (-2.86) (-0.49) (-2.62)
Ladder of life 0.0151*** 0.0139**
(2.74) (2.61)




Economy good/bad 0.530*** 0.489***
(17.52) (17.20)
Economic outlook -0.190*** -0.183***
(-11.61) (-11.70)
Corruption trend -0.272*** -0.207***
(-15.54) (-12.61)
Religious organizations 0.705*** 0.689***
(19.25) (18.81)
_cons 1.537*** 1.752*** 2.238*** 2.034***
(10.26) (12.77) (15.94) (14.40)
N 49019 49019 49019 49019
No. of countries 90 90 90 90
R-sq 0.218 0.378 0.264 0.392
t statistics in parentheses
* p<0.10,  ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  38 
Table 4: Disaggregation of “Confidence in Institutions” Index 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Military Judiciary National Gov. Elections
linear linear linear linear
Corruption experiences -0.0431*** -0.0576*** -0.0480*** -0.0367***
(-4.74) (-5.02) (-4.70) (-3.48)
_cons 0.345*** 0.358*** 0.617*** 0.432***
(8.82) (6.91) (13.47) (9.41)
R-sq 0.232 0.234 0.278 0.271
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Military Judiciary National Gov. Elections
linear linear linear linear
Corruption perceptions -0.0623*** -0.133*** -0.166*** -0.157***
(-6.82) (-12.18) (-13.54) (-13.99)
_cons 0.379*** 0.430*** 0.707*** 0.518***
(9.48) (8.01) (14.98) (11.22)
R-sq 0.234 0.241 0.291 0.282
N 49019 49019 49019 49019
No. of countries 90 90 90 90
t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.10,  ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01  
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Full sample 90 -0.134 0.255 0.678 0.222 -0.466 0.376 0.911 0.633
Europe & Central Asia 11 -0.172 0.200 0.727 0.272 -0.312 0.419 0.818 0.454
Middle-East & North Africa 4 -0.153 0.282 0.750 0.250 -0.730 0.250 1.000 1.000
East Asia & Pacific 9 -0.060 0.175 0.667 0.222 -0.224 0.297 0.778 0.333
South Asia 5 -0.319 0.265 0.800 0.600 -0.104 0.259 0.600 0.400
Latin America & Caribbean 19 -0.194 0.271 0.684 0.369 -0.490 0.191 1.000 0.737
Sub-Saharan Africa 18 -0.061 0.278 0.611 0.222 -0.472 0.521 0.889 0.556
High income: OECD 20 -0.113 0.281 0.650 0.000 -0.561 0.211 1.000 0.800
High income: non-OECD 4 -0.094 0.143 0.750 0.000 -1.006 0.385 1.000 0.750
Low level of corruption 
experiences/perceptions
30 -0.066 0.241 0.600 0.000 -0.485 0.407 0.933 0.633
Medium level of corruption 
experiences/perceptions
30 -0.243 0.238 0.833 0.367 -0.447 0.345 0.867 0.667
High level of corruption 
experiences/perceptions
30 -0.093 0.256 0.600 0.300 -0.465 0.384 0.933 0.600
Low income 30 -0.129 0.272 0.600 0.300 -0.370 0.437 0.867 0.400
Medium income 30 -0.153 0.244 0.733 0.300 -0.449 0.406 0.867 0.733
High income 30 -0.121 0.256 0.700 0.067 -0.579 0.234 1.000 0.767
* statistically significant coefficients at at least the 5 percent level were included
CORRUPTION PERCEPTIONS CORRUPTION EXPERIENCES  40 
Table 6: Why Do Adverse Effects of Corruption Matter? 




















institutions 0.0958*** 0.0776*** 0.0764*** 0.0767***







_cons -0.410*** -0.349** -0.105 -0.0632 -0.354** -0.337**
(-15.02) (-2.42) (-0.77) (-0.46) (-2.48) (-2.36)
N 46249 46249 46249 46249 46249 46249
No. of countries 89 89 89 89 89 89
Controls no yes yes yes yes yes
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Like to move to 
other country?
Like to move to 
other country?
Like to move to 
other country?
Like to move to 
other country?
Like to move to 
other country?
Like to move to 
other country?
Confidence in 
institutions -0.127*** -0.0676*** -0.0629*** -0.0622***







_cons 0.409*** 0.229 0.0492 -0.0486 0.243 0.163
(23.00) (1.07) (0.23) (-0.22) (1.15) (0.76)
N 34184 34184 34184 34184 34184 34184
No. of countries 69 69 69 69 69 69
Controls no yes yes yes yes yes














institutions 0.0259*** 0.0127 0.0183* 0.0127







_cons -0.820*** -2.003*** -1.925*** -1.960*** -1.981*** -2.004***
(-4.44) (-10.63) (-10.41) (-10.12) (-10.97) (-10.65)
N 48774 48774 48774 48774 48774 48774
No. of countries 90 90 90 90 90 90
Controls no yes yes yes yes yes
t statistics in parentheses, * p<0.10,  ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
Models with control variables include the complete set of controls  
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Table 7: Variable Descriptions 
Variable Wording of Question in GWP Definition
Confidence in institutions Index composed of four subcategories of this question: "In 
this country, do you have confidence in each of the following, 
or not? How about the military? Judicial system and courts? 
National government? Honesty of elections?"
scale of 0 to 4 with 4 
indicating highest 
confidence
Corruption experiences "Sometimes people have to give a bribe or a present in order 
to solve their problems. In the last 12 months, were you, 
personally, faced with this kind of situation, or not (regardless 
of whether you have the bribe/present or not)?"
dummy: 1 indicating 
exposure to bribery
Corruption perceptions "Is corruption widespread throughout the government in this 
country, or not?"
dummy: 1 indicating 
corruption is widespread
Male Share of male respondents
Age Age in years
Married "What is your current marital status?"; responses of 
"married" as well as "domestic partner" were aggregated to 
form the "Married" variable
dummy: 1 indicating 
married/domestic partner
Secondary education "What is your highest level of education?" dummy: 1 indicating highest 
level is tertiary education
Tertiary education "What is your highest level of education?" dummy: 1 indicating highest 
level is secondary education
Income "What is your total monthly household income, before taxes? 
Please include income from wages and salaries, remittances 
from family member living elsewhere, farming and all other 
sources."
Income in US dollars
Internet access "Does your home have access to the internet?" dummy: 1 indicating yes
TV "Does your home have a television?" dummy: 1 indicating yes
Ladder of life “Imagine a ladder numbered from zero at the bottom to ten at 
the top. Suppose we say that the top of the ladder represents 
the best possible life for you, and the bottom of the ladder 
represents the worst possible life for you. On which step of 
the ladder would you say you personally feel you stand at 
this time, assuming that the higher the step the better you 
feel about your life, and the lower the step the worse you feel 
about it? Which step comes closest to the way you fell?"
scale of 0 to 10 with 10 
being best life
Standard of living “Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your standard of living, 
all the things you can buy and do?”. 
(0 or 1) with 1 indicating 
satisfied
Emotions Index composed of three subcategories of this question:
“Did you experience the following feelings during a lot of the 
day yesterday? How about Worry? Stress? Happiness?”
scale of 0 to 3 with 3 
indicating yes to all 3 
questions
Economy good/bad "Do you believe the current economic conditions in this 
country are good, or not?"
dummy: 1 indicating good
Economic outlook "Right now, do you think the economic conditions in this 
country as a whole, are getting better or getting worse?"
dummy: 1 indicating better
Corruption trend "Do you think the level of corruption in this country is lower, 
about the same, or higher than it was 5 years ago?"
dummy: 1 indicating 
corruption is higher
Religious organizations "In this country, do you have confidence in each of the 
following, or not? How about religious organizations 
(churches, mosques, temples etc.)?"
dummy: 1 indicating 
confidence
Voiced opinion to public 
official
"Have you done any of the following in the past month? How 
about voiced your opinion to a public official?"
dummy: 1 indicating "yes"
Achieve change by 
peaceful means
"Some people believe that groups that are oppressed and 
are suffering from injustice can improve their situations by 
peaceful means alone. Other do not believe that peaceful 
means alone will work to improve the situation for such 
oppressed groups. Which do you believe?"
dummy: 1 indicating 
"peaceful means alone will 
work"
Like to move to other 
country
"Ideally, if you had the opportunity, would you like to move 
permanently to another country, or would you prefer to 
continue living in this country?"
dummy: 1 indicating "would 
like to move"
 
   42 
Table 8: Countries in Core Sample by Geographical Region 
Europe & 
Central Asia












Armenia Cambodia Bangladesh Argentina  Botswana Algeria Australia Estonia
Azerbaijan Indonesia India Bolivia Burkina Faso Djibouti Austria Israel
Belarus Laos Nepal Brazil Burundi Iran Belgium Malta
Hungary Malaysia Pakistan Chile Cameroon Lebanon Canada Trinidad & Tobago
Latvia Mongolia Sri Lanka Colombia Chad Denmark
Lithuania Philippines Costa Rica Ethiopia Finland
Moldova Taiwan Dominican Rep. Ghana France
Poland Thailand Ecuador Kenya Germany
Russia Vietnam El Salvador Liberia Ireland
Turkey Guatemala Madagascar Italy
Ukraine Haiti Mauritania Japan
Honduras Niger Luxembourg
Mexico Senegal Netherlands
Nicaragua Sierra Leone New Zealand
Panama Tanzania Norway
Paraguay Togo Portugal
Peru Uganda South Korea
Uruguay Zambia Spain
Venezuela Sweden
United Kingdom
 